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Capital Flexibility
By A. C. Littleton
During the recent cycle of inflation and deflation the capital 
problems of corporations have been emphasized in many ways. 
The asset write-ups and stock dividends of the ’20’s and the 
asset write-downs and reductions of stated capital of the ’30’s, as 
well as numerous other practices, were for the most part attempts 
to harmonize inflexible capital and changing asset values.
But this apparent search for flexibility has not gone forward 
without criticism. Abuses have been perceived which raise 
questions of doubt concerning the desirability of continued 
departures from the older methods of financing. For example, 
many corporations themselves are beginning to question the 
efficacy of no-par stock. And yet the objective of capital flexi­
bility in itself still seems desirable.
Note the background of the term “capital stock.” That part 
of the owner’s property which was active in his business affairs 
was at first very probably recorded (if at all) in a simple personal 
account—a credit to some sort of “master’s account” by the 
slave or agent who was responsible for attending to business 
affairs. From the agent’s point of view he “owed” the master 
for the sum entrusted; the master saw only a sum of money 
working in his behalf. To the latter this would be his “principal 
sum” and as the adjective came to be used elliptically as a sub­
stantive it would be thought of as his “principal.” If the term 
had in this form been attached to his account, the title might be 
expected to have become “master’s principal.” When we see 
that the old Latin root word for the adjective “principal” was 
caput (head) and that this word evolved into the mediaeval 
Latin capitalis and into the mediaeval Italian cavedale, and finally 
into the English capital, it is not hard to convince ourselves that 
“master’s capital” or “John Jones, capital” probably grew out 
of such a past.
Shift the scene to the seventeenth century. The trading 
companies, such as the East India Company and others, devel­
oped a species of enlarged partnerships. Each participant con­
tributed from his stock of goods. The united contributions 
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constituted a stock of goods which were owned jointly by the 
participants, in other words, a “joint-stock.” Soon therefore 
“cash debitor to stock” was a typical opening entry. (For 
example, Dafforne, Merchants Mirriour, 1634, and Monteage 
Debtor and Creditor Made Easie, 1690.) “Stock” was here 
representative of the goods or economic capital held in joint-stock.
Presently the two terms crept together. For example, an act 
of parliament in 1697 regarding the Bank of England ( 8 & 9 W 
& M c. 20) mentions “the common, capital, and principal stock 
of the said Governor and Company ------.” At present the
combined terms “capital stock” are in constant use, but we 
seldom appreciate their inconsistency. “Stock” originally 
referred to the goods themselves and “capital” to the proprie­
tor’s principal sum (ownership in the goods). Yet combine these 
apparent opposites in a modern business corporation and we have 
still a third idea—a legal margin contributed by the shareholders 
for the protection of creditors. Today we often drop the noun 
“stock” and use the adjective “capital” to mean such diverse 
things as (1) the assets themselves, (2) the net worth of the pro­
prietor, (3) the legal measure of the limit of dividends.
Obviously there are broad possibilities here for confusion of 
thought and action. But the more important matter for the 
present purpose is the thought that never in the long development 
of organized business and of accounting for business capital has 
there been any deviation from the principle that the capital 
account recorded the contribution made by the stockholders— 
never, that is, until quite recently.
Recent corporation practice in the United States, under the 
influence of factors, such as a greatly accelerated vogue for the 
corporate form for doing business, an increased appetite since 
world-war finance drives for security investments and the rela­
tive freedom from restraint which came in with no-par stock, 
etc., has evolved the doctrine of stated capital under which the 
directors or stockholders designate a portion of the contribution 
to be the creditor’s margin and retain unrestrained control over 
the disposition of the remainder of the contribution as if it were 
accumulated profits.
This is a revolutionary departure from the conception which 
has persisted throughout a long evolution.
But a revolutionary practice should not be condemned on the 
ground that nothing new can be good. On the other hand mere 
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novelty should not recommend a practice on the ground that 
everything old is inadequate for modern conditions. The use of 
a new idea in practical affairs should not alone constitute a suffi­
cient endorsement, nor should the existence of abuses constitute 
sufficient reason for the abolition of a practice which has inherent 
merit. But anything which is as revolutionary as the doctrine 
of stated value does call for thoughtful appraisal.
Several alternatives suggest themselves at once. We could go 
back to the traditional conception of capital stock as the whole 
contribution and thus be free of stated value. We could also 
abandon entirely the idea of a fixed sum, however determined, as a 
margin for creditors. The first would be equivalent to a repudi­
ation of recent developments and would require the restriction of 
many current practices. The second would be equivalent to 
accepting the revolution as progress and extending it to its 
logical sequel.
If we are to hold to the idea that capital stock represents the 
whole of the stockholder’s contributions, it probably would not 
be necessary to abandon no-par stock entirely. No-par is much 
too useful to be legislated out of existence merely because it may 
be open to some abuse. No-par stock should be retained for the 
sake of its flexibility as an original issue, if for no other reason.
Restriction is needed, however, for stated capital in both 
original and subsequent issues. If the whole-contribution con­
cept is to prevail, the stated-value concept must give way; the 
two are so antagonistic as to be irreconcilable. Therefore, any 
statute requiring the whole consideration for an issue of no-par 
stock to be credited to capital-stock account must also prohibit 
stated value. This will necessitate allowing complete latitude 
in the price at which the stock is to be issued.
The use of any statutory minimum price for stock issues would 
also constitute a failure to recognize the fact that there is no 
relationship whatever between the number of shares and the 
value of the property. In a sense a statutory minimum price 
constitutes an equivalent of par value as well as an invitation to 
establish a “stated capital” by resolution of the directors. If a 
minimum price for stock issues is included in the laws in an 
attempt to protect the investor against fraudulent stocks, this 
sort of protection could more properly be attempted through so 




Another corollary to the fact that the number of owners can not 
affect the value of the property is that complete freedom should 
exist to increase or decrease the number of shares outstanding, by 
stock split-ups and recombinations, and openly to issue shares 
for intangibles and promoters’ services. There would be little 
objectionable in these practices provided the public were given 
unmistakable notice of the facts.
In the case of subsequent issues of no-par stock under a statute 
requiring the whole consideration to be credited to capital-stock 
account, there might be a question whether this would not con­
stitute an impairment of the rights of existing stockholders in the 
accumulated surplus. Since every share of common stock new 
or old is an undivided interest in the net worth, it might be 
argued that part of the purchase price was paid for an interest in 
the past surplus and therefore was not a proper credit to capital 
account. But since a credit to paid-in surplus or to earned 
surplus of a part of a capital contribution would be still more 
objectionable, the common-sense thing to do is to ignore the 
hair splitting and credit the whole consideration to capital. It 
may reasonably be presumed that the stockholders have voted 
on the question of the new issue and it will no doubt be agreed 
that the ability and the will to see in the proposal a dilution of 
existing equities can not be created by statute.
Perhaps these modifications and restrictions of no-par stock 
practice would not be sufficient to re-establish the principle of 
treating the whole contribution as capital. Recent developments 
away from a strict adherence to this earlier concept of capital 
stock may indicate a trend which is real progress. If this be 
true, then it would be a mistake to attempt to defeat progress in 
order to hold to the merely traditional.
Yet the issue may be deeper than the old and the new, the 
traditional versus the progressive. Under the earlier practice 
corporation finance was principally called upon in the formation 
of a new grouping of capital—the creation of a corporation where 
none existed before. Under more recent conditions corporate 
finance activities have been much more commonly directed 
toward merging existing corporations and re-arranging the 
capital structure of going concerns. The older problem was 
mainly one of assembling aggregates of limited liability capital 
under one management and issuing documentary evidences of 
the contributions. The newer problem is related to “values,” to 
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the growing consciousness that a corporation is being constantly 
"appraised” in the security markets, that its securities draw 
their value primarily from earning power, that assets are valuable 
only according to the earnings they produce. The modern 
problem of finance therefore is to try to maintain a reasonable 
degree of agreement between a naturally fluctuating element 
(value of assets) and a naturally rigid element (limited liability 
capital obligations). Hence the search for flexibility of capital 
which seems to be behind most of the capital problems of today.
These considerations suggest that a capital flexibility for cor­
porations which would approach the flexibility of proprietor’s cap­
ital might be desirable, provided the creditors of limited liability 
companies were given suitable protection, for creditor protection 
is still necessary if business on credit is to continue unabated.
The minimum margin of protection has heretofore been the 
capital-stock account representing either the whole contribution 
or a designated part of it. But in any event the capital has been 
a fixed sum. Obviously flexibility of capital and a fixed sum of 
capital are incompatible. So the question appears whether the 
creditors might not be given satisfactory protection without the 
use of a fixed sum of capital as a margin. If this were accom­
plished it should have the effect of making the capital structure 
more flexible so far as stock and surplus were concerned.
Assume the following legal restrictions upon corporate capital 
stock:
1. In lieu of a fixed sum as a margin for creditors, the corpora­
tion shall pledge itself not to allow the relationship between the 
total indebtedness (including preferred stock) and the reasonable 
value of the total assets to fall below a percentage which the 
corporation’s charter agrees to maintain.
2. All preferred stock must have a par value expressing the 
liquidation preference in assets, is to be cumulative, callable, non­
participating and preferred as to income (in order to exclude 
border-line cases which are closer to common stocks).
3. All common stock of whatever class must be without par 
value and may be issued for any consideration satisfactory to the 
directors and stockholders.
4. The creditors (including preferred stockholders) shall have 
the right to elect a certain number (minority) of directors annually.
5. Upon the failure of the corporation to maintain the specified 
ratio of assets and indebtedness, the creditors (including preferred 
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stockholders) shall immediately have the right to elect a majority 
of the directors.
6. Insolvency and the usual seizure through the courts of 
assets specifically pledged would follow upon the failure to pay 
interest or principal on a bond when due, as at present.
If the assumed restrictions were in force the following would be 
some of the expected consequences:
1. A plainer recognition of the principle that all suppliers of 
capital differ from one another only as to the terms of their “cap­
ital-contract” and that the corporation should be managed with 
the interests of all parties receiving consideration.
2. The creditors through their representatives on the board of 
directors would have a voice in the management and direct 
knowledge of current plans and policies. This representation, 
with the enforced maintenance of a definite ratio of assets and 
debt and the conditional right to control the policies, would be 
an effective substitute for a fixed sum margin and the so-called 
trust-fund doctrine of capital stock.
3. With the creditors thus better protected than at present 
common-stock account and surplus could be made as flexible as 
an individual proprietor’s capital account. The legal necessity 
for distinguishing between common stock and surplus would 
disappear; a single “net-capital account” would suffice.
4. The “net-capital account” would be a true net worth ac­
count, a real indication of residual proprietorship, fluctuating as 
proprietorship fluctuated, subject to increase or decrease in the 
number of “participation certificates” as the holders saw fit and 
to such withdrawals or “assessments” as the directors, represent­
ing all suppliers of capital, should decide.
5. Although sub-accounts would be desirable for accounting 










Reserves transferred to special accounts
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In the past, creditors’ margin was the whole sum contributed 
by the stockholders; at present the tendency is toward a director- 
designated portion of the contribution, apparently in the search 
for greater flexibility of proprietary capital. The proposal here 
outlined increases the real protection of all classes of creditors 
and at the same time increases the flexibility of proprietary cap­
ital accounting and management. On the surface that would 
seem to be a desirable accomplishment.
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